Winning the Peace

I am a retired Marine whose life reflects the Sophoclean hero motif. I would welcome an opportunity to speak with you about a plan that is the fruit of 30 years in service to the nation. One that I believe uniquely meets the challenges and opportunities facing America at this time.

My program concentrates on a DOD-led strategy that tackles counterinsurgency and other seemingly-intractable problems in partner nations utilizing the current "Foreign Area Officer" (FAO - "fay-o") programs within the Departments of Defense and State in an entirely new way to meet the asymmetric nature of current conflicts.

Their current foreign language training is probably great if we want our FAOs sitting inside nondescript buildings all day everyday listening to foreign language radio and governmental intercepts for clues as to the order of battle of the Soviet military; however, it is inadequate to the task of developing reading, writing, listening, and speaking skills that allow a FAO to operate unilaterally in foreign nations.

If any FAO and his counterpart routinely speak English (a practice that is currently all too common) to each other, then be assured that the FAO’s foreign language skills are worse than the English skills of the foreign national. Let me say this in another way, if the counterpart’s English is barely intelligible  then you can know that the FAO’s command of his foreign language is even worse; if not, they would both be speaking the foreign language. In this case the counterpart is not practicing his English, he is simply trying to facilitate communication. On the other hand, if the FAO is speaking his counterpart’s language and the counterpart is responding in fluent English and there appears to be a fluid conversation taking place, our FAO is probably fluent. In too many cases FAOs’ language skills are inadequate for the current mission, let alone an expanded mission that may actually support strategy development, implementation, and victory.

We are going to have to develop relationships with non-traditional allies, particularly allies located along the fault lines of where civilizations clash, as well as reinvigorating possibly dormant relationships with longstanding partner nations. (These may evolve, so, while Latin America and the Middle East are the focus of concern, at present, this shouldn't limit us in decision-making. The process and tools of the program I call "Winning the Peace" (WP)

can be looked at in terms of the "5 W's”: “When?” “Who?” “What?”  “Where?” and “Why?” The When? Is sadly obvious. Answer: Yesterday.  Unfortunately, bureaucracies being what they are ASAP will now have to do for now.  Moving on to “Who?” The old picture of the foreign area officers (FAOs) as brainy guys/gals in cubicles, wearing ear-buds that fill their heads with [insert any foreign language here], as they write furiously and think even faster – speaking English to each other at lunch – has got to go.  Instead, say hello to the new kids on the block: the WP FAOs.  

Now, we've arrived at our next question: What? The mission is paramilitary by design. However, The DOD must lead here, because no other governmental agencies possess the institutional knowledge/skills required for the mission's success.   Our WP advisers will work in the field with Partner Nation (PN) military and/or paramilitary units and focus on improving their ability to sustain themselves in the field.  WP primary focus is on developing PN’s intel, supply, maintenance, and logistics capabilities, including measures to prevent Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) from illegal fund raising and transferring of funds. These tasks illustrate the “move” and “communicate” portions of the “Move. Shoot. Communicate.” dictum. Special Forces have got shooting covered.  Which brings us to:  “Where?”

I had in mind a WP pilot program to be fielded in Mexico. By beta-testing in Mexico, we begin in a relatively benign environment; stop and then reverse the death spiral in which Mexico finds herself, while proving the concept with the shortest of possible communication and supply lines. Additional benefits of starting in Mexico is that it reduces the program's vulnerability to “war on Islam” attacks, and has a slightly better chance of winning the support inevitably required from the Department of State and CIA. Those agencies'  roles are indispensable in getting foreign governments to accept the program, supporting force protection measures, and identifying the organizations and their leaders that need to be taken down. The Mexican pilot program is to be the first and perhaps the longest running of these programs. The threat of the Mexican situation to our nation has been downplayed for far too long. Advocating for a program such as this, may force politicians to address our responsibility in the chaos occurring in Mexico and support the fix. In helping Mexico, we help ourselves; and, test the practicality of the Winning the Peace program before fielding this in Africa and/or Asia. (Could a Europe increasingly-unrecognizable to many of her citizens benefit from this strategic tool, with similar parameters, as well?)